El desarrollo institucional en el contexto de la ineficacia de la ayuda: ¿qué podemos hacer?

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Pablo Bandeira

Resumen

¿Qué es el desarrollo institucional?, ¿hasta qué punto es necesario para el desarrollo económico y social de los países?, ¿qué instituciones concretas promueven el desarrollo?, ¿por qué no se implantan de forma natural?, ¿cómo fomentarlas a través de la cooperación internacional? Estas son las preguntas a las que, dentro del contexto de la ineficacia que parece estar teniendo la Ayuda Oficial para el Desarrollo hasta ahora, trata de responder este artículo, partiendo de los estudios que se han publicado recientemente a nivel internacional. Se termina haciendo una llamada a los organismos de cooperación para que consideren de manera más explícita, técnica y transparente los problemas políticos de los países receptores de la ayuda.

Palabras clave:
Desarrollo institucional , buen gobierno , gobernabilidad democrática , eficacia de la ayuda

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Cómo citar
Bandeira, P. (2009). El desarrollo institucional en el contexto de la ineficacia de la ayuda: ¿qué podemos hacer?. Revista De Fomento Social, (255), 459-498. https://doi.org/10.32418/rfs.2009.255.1979
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Estudios

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